Yeah knowing a few things, but not many, about Rawls and the original position thing, the application of that reasoning to something like the Masterpiece Cakeshop case clearly requires a great deal of interpretation, and the conclusion Chandler (?) reaches about that case is not at all a straightforward application, much less a consequence, of the original position.
I have always thought that the idea of the original position, like so many other thought experiments, starts to buckle when you try to get specific about the information you would want to have in order to make a decision about what the principles should be. I think the persuasiveness of the thought experiments depends on underdescribing what is actually involved, and how many different issues would be connected to the government's role in enacting the principles of justice. But like I said this makes it similar to most other thought experiments: when you press for details, it gets tough.
Rawls’s thought experiment is more fleshed out than, say, Locke’s. Would you say that the simplicity of Locke’s thought experiment makes it more convincing?
Initially, yes, though if I understand them correctly, and I definitely might not, Locke's commits you to less. That is, it seems like the principles Rawls draws from the original position are stronger than those Locke takes from his thought experiment—like Rawls gets Locke + other stuff. So it may be more persuasive for being simpler, but if it's meant to accomplish less, then it doesn't need to be as strong.
This comment is a naive response to your synthesis of Chandler's synthesis of Rawls, but I really loved the last two paragraphs. Strong takeaways there. I also thought it really hilarious how quick Chandler seems to sacrifice core Rawlsian principles if it suits his worldview. Doesn't that undermine the whole system Rawls proposes? Seems to invite a number of questions about human nature and how maybe that nature doesn't sit well with Rawls's attempts at a well-reasoned approach to politics.
One thing Chandler does note is that there is a range of political interpretations of Rawls--he leans towards progressivism, but there are "right-wing Rawlsians," who, I gather, think that the realistic utopia is one that prioritizes economic growth more than the progressives. So I don't know if differences in prioritizing public reasons discredits Rawls; he's not ideological enough to have any one set of advocates prove his failures. But sure, there are practical questions about how much we can really put ourselves into the minds of any and all people to evaluate certain policies.
If Rawls had a core set of principles, though, and someone discards those principles (especially as quickly as Chandler seems to) at what point do they cease to be Rawlsian as opposed to just normative political theorists?
Yeah knowing a few things, but not many, about Rawls and the original position thing, the application of that reasoning to something like the Masterpiece Cakeshop case clearly requires a great deal of interpretation, and the conclusion Chandler (?) reaches about that case is not at all a straightforward application, much less a consequence, of the original position.
I have always thought that the idea of the original position, like so many other thought experiments, starts to buckle when you try to get specific about the information you would want to have in order to make a decision about what the principles should be. I think the persuasiveness of the thought experiments depends on underdescribing what is actually involved, and how many different issues would be connected to the government's role in enacting the principles of justice. But like I said this makes it similar to most other thought experiments: when you press for details, it gets tough.
Rawls’s thought experiment is more fleshed out than, say, Locke’s. Would you say that the simplicity of Locke’s thought experiment makes it more convincing?
Initially, yes, though if I understand them correctly, and I definitely might not, Locke's commits you to less. That is, it seems like the principles Rawls draws from the original position are stronger than those Locke takes from his thought experiment—like Rawls gets Locke + other stuff. So it may be more persuasive for being simpler, but if it's meant to accomplish less, then it doesn't need to be as strong.
This comment is a naive response to your synthesis of Chandler's synthesis of Rawls, but I really loved the last two paragraphs. Strong takeaways there. I also thought it really hilarious how quick Chandler seems to sacrifice core Rawlsian principles if it suits his worldview. Doesn't that undermine the whole system Rawls proposes? Seems to invite a number of questions about human nature and how maybe that nature doesn't sit well with Rawls's attempts at a well-reasoned approach to politics.
One thing Chandler does note is that there is a range of political interpretations of Rawls--he leans towards progressivism, but there are "right-wing Rawlsians," who, I gather, think that the realistic utopia is one that prioritizes economic growth more than the progressives. So I don't know if differences in prioritizing public reasons discredits Rawls; he's not ideological enough to have any one set of advocates prove his failures. But sure, there are practical questions about how much we can really put ourselves into the minds of any and all people to evaluate certain policies.
If Rawls had a core set of principles, though, and someone discards those principles (especially as quickly as Chandler seems to) at what point do they cease to be Rawlsian as opposed to just normative political theorists?
I guess I wouldn't say that Chandler discards those principles; he just prioritizes them in a way that I didn't always find convincing.